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Abstract
In this paper I analyze the effects of the mergers between Delta-Northwest and
Continental-United on airfares. I use data from before the announcement of the mergers
to model prices and then forecast what prices would have been after the mergers had
the mergers not occurred.
By comparing the actual observed fares and the predicted fares, I find that fares are
lower than predicted during the periods of the mergers’ announcements and higher
than predicted afterwards. Overall, fares after the announcement of the merger are
higher than predicted, and market power effects from the merger dominate efficiency
gains. However, I find that several variables do not have the effect on airfares that one
would expect.
I. Introduction
In this paper, I explore how airline mergers in the United States in the past
decade have affected airfares. Specifically, I look at Delta’s acquisition of Northwest
Airlines between 2008 and 2010, and United Airline’s acquisition of Continental
Airlines in 2010. Delta and Northwest announced their merger on April 15, 2008. The
merger was approved by the Department of Justice on October 29, 2008 and completed
on December 31, 2009. The merged airline, which took the Delta name, became the
largest airline in the world at the time. United Airlines and Continental Airlines began
discussing a merger in February 2008 but broke off merger negotiations in April
2008. The two airlines resumed talks and signed an alliance pact in June 2008 to link
technologies and share networks and passenger perks. On May 2, 2010, the boards
of directors of each airline approved a deal to combine the two airlines and overtake
Delta as the new largest airline in the world. The merger was publicly announced the
next day. The Department of Justice approved the merger on August 27, 2010 and the
merger was completed on October 1, 2010. The combined airline began operating
under the United name on November 30, 2011.
Mergers have potential to create efficiency gains from economies of scale
and scope, but the newly merged firm may also exercise market power effects and
charge higher fares to consumers or steal market share from competitors. These two
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mergers had the potential to greatly impact consumers by creating such large players
in the aviation industry. An analysis of the effect of the mergers on airfares can be
useful in retrospectively analyzing the government’s decision to approve the mergers.
Furthermore, it can be useful for analyzing whether the government should approve
similar mergers between large airlines in today’s aviation market. For instance, an
empirical analysis of the effect of these mergers on airfares may shed light on the
potential effects of the merger between American Airlines and US Airways that was
approved in November 2013, and also created a new largest airline in the world.
II. Literature Review
A. History of U.S. Antitrust Policy
Antitrust policy began in the United States in response to many large national
companies engaging in monopolistic practices at the end of the 19th century. The
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Act of 1890 were designed to
prevent trusts — a term that was eventually used to describe all forms of suspect
business combinations — from using monopoly power against the public interest.
Specifically, the Sherman Act was passed in response to Rockefeller’s Standard Oil
Company allegedly engaging in predatory pricing to drive out competition and then
obtain monopoly profits by restricting output and raising prices. Congress then passed
the Clayton Antitrust Act in 1914 to explicitly outlaw more activities. As interpreted by
the Court, certain actions or structures are illegal per se, meaning they are inherently
illegal, while others are analyzed according to the rule of reason. For instance, price
fixing and other horizontal agreements between distinct companies are generally
illegal per se. Horizontal and vertical mergers and predatory pricing are subject to
examination under the rule of reason, meaning they are illegal if and only if it can be
demonstrated that they are anticompetitive (Clarkson and Miller 1982).
Anticompetitive mergers are banned under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Over
time the Court has held that in order to establish a case against a merger, there must
be a trend toward concentration in the industry, the proposed merger must increase
concentration, the merged firm must have an undue market share, and there must be
difficult entry into the market. Possible defenses include increases in efficiency and
the failing company defense — if the acquired firm is failing, the Court usually allows
the merger since the acquired firm was not a viable competitor before the merger
(Clarkson and Miller 1982).
The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission both publish
merger guidelines. In August 2010, the two government agencies jointly published
“Horizontal Merger Guidelines.” The government uses several forms of evidence to
predict the competitive effects of a merger. Sometimes, the government uses the actual
effects observed if it is challenging a consummated merger, but usually it challenges
mergers before they are consummated and must rely on predictive analysis. For this,
it uses comparisons to similar mergers, assessments of market share concentration and
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changes in market power, assessments of competition between the two merging firms,
and whether the merger eliminates a firm with the potential to disrupt the industry with
new technology (DOJ and FTC, 2010).
The DOJ and FTC rely on market concentration as one useful indicator of
the competitive effects of a merger. The agencies often use the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) to measure market concentration. The HHI is calculated by summing the
squares of each individual firm’s market share. The government considers both the
post-merger HHI and the change in HHI from the merger. Change in HHI measures the
amount of overlap between the two merging firms (Kim and Singal 1993). The agencies
generally classify markets with HHI below 1500 as unconcentrated, HHI between 1500
and 2500 as moderately concentrated, and HHI above 2500 as highly concentrated. A
change in HHI of less than 100 is considered a small change in concentration, a change
between 100 and 200 is considered a moderate change, and a change above 200 is
considered a large change. Mergers involving either a small change in concentration
or mergers that result in an unconcentrated market are both unlikely to have adverse
anticompetitive effects and usually do not require further analysis. Mergers resulting
in a moderately concentrated market and a moderate or large change in concentration
raise significant competitive concerns and often warrant government scrutiny. Mergers
resulting in highly concentrated markets and a moderate change in concentration often
warrant scrutiny. Finally, mergers resulting in highly concentrated markets and large
change in concentration are presumed to enhance market power unless the merging
companies prove otherwise with sufficient evidence (DOJ and FTC 2010).
B. The American Aviation Industry
The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 had a substantial impact on the
organization of the airline industry. Prior to the Act, airlines had to seek regulatory
approval from the Civil Aeronautics Board in order to service routes or change fares.
This regulation essentially served as a barrier to entry that promoted monopolies on
certain routes. The Deregulation Act also removed controls overs fares and the entry
of new airlines into the industry (Weisman 1990). This led to a wave of entry, which
lowered profits per firm, which led to the wave of mergers in the 1980s studied by
Kim and Singal (1993) (Bittlingmayer 1985). The Act lowered average fare (adjusted
for inflation) and increased passenger loads. However, it also forced many airlines
into bankruptcy and consolidation (Weisman 1990). It also led to firms employing
the hub-and-spoke approach that is described further in the next section (Shy 1995,
Borenstein 1989). This system enabled larger carriers to establish market power over
hubs. The growth of low-cost air carriers like Southwest and JetBlue also led to more
direct flights offered.
C. Economic Theory
One of the unique features about the aviation industry is that airlines not
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only set a price and quantity, but also a networking structure. Airlines strategically
decide to either offer direct flights or stopover flights via the hub-and-spoke approach
(Bittlingmayer 1990). For instance, Shy (1995) presents a basic model with a
monopolist firm and three cities that demonstrates making one city a hub can save
costs since the airlines only needs to operate two routes instead of three. Specifically,
the hub-and-spoke approach is less costly if the fixed cost of operating the route is
large relative to the number of passengers in each route (Shy 1995). Deregulation of
the industry led to more competition and fewer passengers per route per airline, which
in part explains why deregulation caused many airlines to shift towards the hub-andspoke approach (Borenstein 1989).
Shy (1995) presents a consumer demand model:
Ui=diδ + √fi-pi if pi ≤ diδ+√fi and fi≥0, and 0 otherwise, where di is a dummy variable
that captures whether a flight is direct (di=1) or not (di=0), δ represents how much more
a consumer is willing to pay for a direct flight than a stopover flight, fi represents the
frequency of flights, and √fi represents consumers’ additional utility gain from more
frequent flights. Shy (1995) chooses to use frequency (departures per day) instead of
passengers per route to measure output since costs depend more on departures per
unit of time than on passengers per flight and since frequency influences passengers’
utility. While informative, this model is not particularly useful for analyzing strategic
decisions in a competitive environment.
There is debate in the literature over whether the government (specifically,
the Civil Aeronautics Board) should regulate the industry by setting a minimum
airfare to prevent strict competition where prices converge to marginal costs as seen
in the Bertrand model. Judge Richard Posner (1975) offers an argument against such
regulation. First, the industry is at an equilibrium where price p0 is equal to each firm’s
identical per passenger cost c0., following a Bertrand model. Suppose the CAB sets
a minimum airfare pmin above p0=co so that firms can make a positive per unit profit.
Posner (1975) predicts that airlines will start to compete on services like food, drinks
and frequency of flights since they are legally prohibited from competing on price by
charging below pmin. This competition will raise each firm’s per unit cost to c1=pmin and
per unit profit will again equal zero. Furthermore, passengers will reduce their number
of flights purchased after the regulation. Granted, demand may shift out, but Posner
still predicts the new equilibrium quantity will be lower than before regulation. This
argument relies on the fact that demand will not shift out that much after firms improve
their services, since if consumers cared that much about services, the firms would have
competed on services before price regulation was imposed (Posner 1975, Shy 1995).
An important area to explore is a theoretical description of the competition
between firms. Gelman and Salop (1983) present a theory called Judo Economics to
describe potential competition between a large firm and a small entrant. Consider a
two stage sequential game with an incumbent and potential entrant. The potential
entrant first chooses whether to enter, its capacity k, and its price pe. The incumbent
then chooses its price pI in the second stage. In the model, the incumbent firm is large
and has an unlimited capacity (or at least sufficient to cater to all consumers who the
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demand the product). Like in Bertrand competition, consumers prefer the brand with
the lower price, and the firm with a lower price captures the entire demand given its
capacity. The incumbent firm has two options in the second stage (all but these two
are weakly dominated). It can fight the entrant by setting pI=pe (the model assumes
the incumbent captures all of the demand when prices are equal) or accommodate by
setting its price at its profit maximizing price. If the entrant’s price is lower than the
incumbent’s price, the entrant gets his capacity k, and the incumbent gets the rest of
the demand. If the entrant’s price is greater than or equal to the incumbent’s price, the
incumbent gets all of the demand. Gelman and Salop (1983) show that there exists a
sufficiently low combination of capacity k and price pe set by the entrant such that the
incumbent will find it profitable to accommodate entry rather than fight.
While this model does not sufficiently explain the competitive environment
in all routes, it can help explain why on some routes we observe a large firm with
substantial market share and a small firm with lower prices and a small but nonnegligible market share. The intuition behind cooperation in infinitely repeated
games, given firms’ strategies and their discount rates, may help explain why we see
firms maintain positive profits despite Bertrand’s result that prices should converge
to marginal cost in a competitive environment with identical goods (Axelrod 1982).
D. Empirical Approaches
Kim and Singal (1993) present several different empirical methods for
analyzing the effects of airline mergers. Their analysis relies on comparing sample
routes with control routes to see how mergers affect airfare. Sample routes are those
served by at least one of the merging airlines in the study looking at mergers in the
1980s (the “merger wave” following deregulation). Control routes are routes on which
neither of the merging firms operated and whose distance falls within 7.5 percent of
that of the sample route. Their analysis relies heavily on the assumption that industry
wide changes like fluctuations in fuel price, labor cost, and seasonal or cyclical changes
in demand are likely to have equivalent effects on routes of similar distance.
The authors compare the fare changes of the sample routes with the fare
changes of the control routes: Log fare change = log(farese/faresb)-log(farece/farecb)
where c is control, s is sample, e is end of a period, and b is beginning of a period.
The authors test the hypothesis that that this variable is statistically different from 0.
They also test whether the relative fares (a ratio of sample to control) are statistically
different from 1.
Kim and Singal’s (1993) main analysis is to regress log fare change on the
change in HHI while controlling for whether or not the acquired firm was financially
distressed before the merger and the route distance, which affects the viability of rail
and bus as substitutes. The change in HHI is calculated as log(HHIse/HHIsb)-log(HHIce/
HHIcb). As previously discussed with the DOJ and FTC guidelines (2010), the change
in HHI measures the amount of overlap between the two merging firms. If firms have a
lot of overlapping routes, then there is more of an opportunity for gains and for market
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power effects. The authors contend that if market power effects dominate efficiency
gains, then the change in HHI will be positively correlated with the change in price,
and if efficiency gains dominate, this correlation will be negative.
The authors separate financially distressed mergers from normal mergers
since financially distressed firms are more concerned with avoiding bankruptcy and
may not change pricing behavior until the merger is completed. The authors also
separate the announcement period of the merger from the completion period because
market power effects may start to take place when firms start to discuss the possibility
of merging and tacit cooperation ensues, while efficiency gains from economies of
scale and scope are not observed until the merger is consummated. The authors further
differentiate between mergers where the firms have overlapping routes, hubs, both or
neither. Firms that share both routes and hubs have the most potential for efficiency
gains and market power effects, while firms that share neither should have the least
potential for both efficiency gains and market power effects (Kim and Singal 1993).
The authors find that for normal firm mergers, the coefficient of log fare
change when regressed on change in HHI is statistically significant and positive during
the announcement period, negative during the completion period, and negative during
the full period — meaning that efficiency gains dominate for most types of mergers.
However, market power effects dominate for mergers where the firms share neither a
hub nor route, and these mergers account for 76% of the sample. The authors predict
that mergers in the subsample of airlines that share neither a hub nor route should not
see efficiency gains or market power effects, and are puzzled by why market power
effects are observed. Bernheim and Whinston (1990) offer a possible explanation
based on the idea of multimarket contact. Firms that compete in many networks are
more likely to tacitly collude on price. In other words, say firms X and Y compete on
several routes, some of which are dominated by X and some by Y. Firm X may not
undercut Y in a route where Y dominates in order to protect its own dominance in other
routes. Mergers make this oligopolistic result more likely. The authors conclude by
noting that mergers generally increased airfare by around 10% for the merging firms,
and rival firms responded with proportional increases in price (Kim and Singal 1993).
Ma, Sun and Tang (2004) present one example of using stock valuations rather
than prices to analyze mergers with their study of the railroad industry. The authors
find that events that made the Sante Fe and Southern Pacific merger less likely had a
negative impact on stock prices for the two firms and their rivals since these events
lowered the probability of all future mergers, which the authors allege the investors
thought added value to the firms because of market power effects.
Kim and Singal (1993) offer a critique of these stock market based analyses,
specifically of the study by at Eckbo (1989). First, events impact the probability of
the relevant merger and all future mergers. This is a problem since a positive event
will make rival firms less valuable since they make the merger more likely and the
merging firms will have market power effects that hurt their rivals, but also make rival
firms more valuable since it increases the probability they will merge and become
more valuable in the future. Second, the period between a merger announcement and
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completion is relatively long, usually lasting about a year. This is too long to make
meaningful inferences regarding the impact of antitrust challenges on stock prices.
In addition, antitrust challenges reduce the positive effect of market power and the
negative effect of efficiency gains. These stock market based studies only look at the
net effect of a merger without differentiating these two distinct effects. Finally, these
tests are too indirect since stock market data aggregates a firm’s performance in all
markets, while a merger may affect a firm’s market power in just a fraction of its
business.
Another way of evaluating the effects of a horizontal merger is by treating
it similar to a cartel (Schmalensee and Willig 1989). In calculating damages from
cartels designed to fix prices, researchers often rely on a model that predicts what
prices would have been “but-for” the alleged conspiracy and calculate overcharges
by comparing this but-for price with the actual observed price (Nieberding 2006).
This type of regression can only be used after a merger has occurred since it relies on
comparing predicted data with actual observed data.
There are two commonly used methods to estimate overcharge: the dummy
variable approach and the forecasting approach (Nieberding 2006). The dummy
variable approach adds a dummy variable equal to 1 when the conspiracy is in effect
and 0 when it is not. If the dependent variable is expressed as the log of price, then the
coefficient of this dummy variable indicates the overcharge from the cartel (Rubinfeld
and Steiner 1983). The model uses data from both the conspiracy and nonconspiracy
period to predict prices during the conspiracy period. This is both a weakness and
strength of the model. One can argue that conspiracy data should be used and therefore
the forecasting model ignores relevant data, and one can argue that conspiracy data
should not be used to predict but-for prices since overcharges may vary throughout the
period. One way around this problem is to create more dummy variables for different
subsets of the period to capture the different overcharges, but if a dummy variable
is created for every possible period, the model becomes identical to the forecasting
model (Rubinfeld and Steiner 1983).
The forecasting model uses only data from periods not affected by the
conspiracy to predict what prices would have been but for the collusive behavior.
Researchers try to construct a regression that accurately predicts observed prices from
before the conspiracy and then use this regression to predict but for prices. Overcharges
are then calculated by comparing these prices with actual observed prices during the
conspiracy (Nieberding 2006). Similar models can be used to predict what prices on
a route affected by a merger would have been but-for the merger, and the effect of the
merger on airfares can be described the same way overcharge is calculated in pricefixing antitrust schemes.
III. Description of Data
A. Flight Data
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The dataset used in this analysis contains quarterly data from the final
quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2013. The data comes from the Department
of Transportation’s Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report and is publicly available
online.1 The data is organized by route, which is defined as a one-way unique
combination of origin and destination. For each route in a given quarter, the data
gives the following information: distance (in miles), passengers per day, average fare
(dollars), the largest carrier, the market share of the largest carrier, the average fare for
the largest carrier, the lowest fare carrier, the market share of the lowest fare carrier,
and average fare for the lowest fare carrier. Origin and destination are coded only as
cities and do not indicate airport.
Table 1 shows average fare of the largest carrier, average fare of all carriers,
and average passengers per day for routes where Delta or Northwest is the largest
carrier. Both fare values are adjusted for inflation by converting to 2009 dollars using
the Consumer Price Index, obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. I limit the
data to routes where Delta or Northwest is the largest carrier so that I can use Delta or
Northwest’s actual fare in my analysis. Table 2 shows the same information, limited to
combinations of routes between New York, Atlanta, Cincinnati, Detroit, Minneapolis
and Salt Lake City on which Delta or Northwest in the largest carrier. These six cities
all contain airports that are Delta hubs (see Table 12). Delta’s hub in Detroit was
acquired through the merger. Northwest also had a hub in Minneapolis, which is an
overlapping hub and creates more opportunities for efficiency gains. As I will discuss
later, my analysis samples different routes for each merger. I choose hubs since Delta
is more likely to be the largest carrier on routes between its hubs, and since these
routes are busy and are likely to contain a relatively high number of passengers per
day. The public and government should be more concerned with manifestations of
market power effects on busy routes with a relatively high number of passengers per
day since the higher fares affect more consumers.
The before period in Table 1 is from the beginning of the sample to the first
quarter of 2008. The merger was announced in the second quarter of 2008 on April 14.
The announcement period is the period between the announcement of the merger and
completion of the merger. It begins with the second quarter of 2008 and ends with the
final quarter of 2009, as the merger was completed on December 31, 2009. The after
merger period (also referred to as the completion period) begins with the first quarter
of 2010 and ends with the second quarter of 2013, which is the last quarter for which
data is available.
Table 1: Fares and passengers where Delta or Northwest is largest carrier
Average Fare
(Delta-Northwest)

Std
Dev

Average
Fare (all
airlines)

Std
Dev

Passengers
per day

Std
Dev

1

http://www.dot.gov/policy/aviation-policy/domestic-airline-fares-consumer-report
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Before Merger

$270

75

$256

65

1171

1579

After Merger

$273

47

$258

40

1116

1446

Average Fare
(Delta-Northwest)

Std
Dev

Average
Fare (all
airlines)

Std
Dev

Passengers
per day

Std
Dev

$242

69

$244
$241

62
63

101

346

$246

52

102

314

Announcement
Period

Before Merger

Announcement
Period
After Merger

$266

75

$248

69

$247

58

$252

70

1106

99

1504

296

Table 2: Fares and passengers where Delta or Northwest is largest carrier, limited to
hubs
In both datasets, Delta or Northwest’s fare goes down during the announcement
period and up during the completion period. On all routes where Delta or Northwest is
the largest carrier, Delta or Northwest’s average fare after the merger is just below the
average fare before the merger. On the routes that I sample, Delta or Northwest’s fare
during the completion period rises to above what it was before the merger. The average
fare over all airlines similarly falls during the announcement period then rises during
the completion period over all routes where Delta or Northwest is the largest carrier
and in my sample. Passengers per day also falls during the announcement period
then rises during the completion period for both the larger dataset and the sampled
routes. For all routes and for the sample, passengers per day remains relatively steady.
Analyzing these numbers without controlling for other factors that may impact price is
not too useful, and not much can be said about the effects of the merger from this data
alone. Fares are slightly higher in the sample than the entire dataset and passengers
per day is significantly higher. This was expected, as the sample was not intended to
be representative but was chosen since these routes tend have the most observations
where one of the airlines is the largest carrier, and since effects from the merger are
more interesting on these busier routes.
Tables 3 and 4 are look at the same information as Tables 1 and 2, respectively,
but for the Continental-United merger. The time periods are defined the same way. The
merger was announced on May 3, 2010 and completed on October 3, 2010. The before
period therefore begins in the final quarter of 2000 and ends with the first quarter of
2010. The announcement period goes from the second quarter of 2010 to the third
quarter of 2010. The completion period begins with the final quarter of 2010 and ends
with the second quarter of 2013, the final quarter of the data. The hubs used for this
analysis are Washington, DC, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, Denver, New York
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and Houston (See Table 13). United’s hub in New York (Newark Liberty International
Airport in Newark, New Jersey) was acquired through the merger. Continental
Airlines had a hub and was headquartered in Houston, which is an overlapping hub.
Table 3: Fares and passengers where Continental or United is largest carrier

Before Merger

Average Fare
(ContinentalUnited)

Std Average Fare
Dev (all airlines)

Std Passengers Std
Dev per day
Dev

$261

76

$253

67

135

400

$266

65

$263

60

152

611

Announcement $248
Period
After Merger

58

$244

55

100

318

Table 4: Fares and passengers where Continental or United is largest carrier, limited
to hubs

Before Merger

Average Fare
(ContinentalUnited)

Std
Dev

Average Fare
(all airlines)

Std Passengers Std
Dev per day
Dev

$295

120

$250

93

2433

1055

$300

77

$253

52

3806

2203

Announcement $268
Period
After Merger

65

$229

51

2591

583

Like in the Delta dataset, the average fare for Continental or United where
one of the airlines is the largest carrier falls during the announcement period and then
rises during the completion period. For both the larger dataset and the sample, fares
rise during the completion period to above what they were before the merger. These
trends are also true for the average fare of all airlines. For all routes, passengers per
day falls during the announcement period then rises during the completion period
to above what it was before the merger. For the sample routes, passengers per day
rises during the announcement period then again during the completion period. The
announcement period is only the second and third quarters of 2010, so it may be too
small to draw any useful conclusions from. Again like the Delta dataset, the sample
has higher fares and is much busier measured by passengers per day than the average
over the entire dataset where Continental or United is the largest carrier.
B. Other Data
I obtain data from other sources to control for some factors that may impact airfares. I
use the Federal Reserve Economic Data’s (FRED) information on disposable income
per capita. This data is quarterly and already adjusted to 2009 dollars. Unemployment
comes from the BLS. This dataset contains monthly unemployment rates. I calculate
quarterly averages for my analysis. I also use the Bureau of Transportation Statistic’s
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domestic fuel cost per gallon data. I adjust to 2009 dollars using CPI and calculate
quarterly averages from monthly data.
Tables 5-10 show average fuel cost per 1000 gallons of jet fuel, disposable
income per capita, and unemployment rate for the periods before, during and after
each of the two mergers. I also present Figures 1-3 that graph these variables over
time, and mark the announcement and completion of each merger. The first red line
marks the announcement of the Delta-Northwest merger in the second quarter of 2008
and the second marks the completion of the merger at the end of the fourth quarter of
2009. The first yellow line marks the announcement of the Continental-United merger
in the second quarter of 2010 and the second marks the completion of the merger at the
end of the third quarter of 2010. The horizontal axis is year and quarter (for instance,
20001 is the first quarter of 2000).
Tables 5 and 6 show that for both mergers, the average fuel cost is increasing
from the before period to the announcement period to the completion period. Figure 1
demonstrates that fuel cost is steadily rising before the Delta merger. It starts to fall then
rise again during the completion of the merger. It continues to rise into the announcement
period of the United merger and levels off around the end of 2011. Figure 1 helps
illustrate why fuel cost may not be a good variable to control for in a model. Fuel costs
changes drastically during the announcement period of the Delta merger. The model
regresses only over the period before the merger, and it is possible that whatever effect
of fuel cost on airfares it outputs will not hold during the sudden drop in fuel costs.
Table

5:

Fuel

Before Merger

Announcement Period
After Merger
Table

6:

Before Merger

Fuel

Announcement Period
After Merger

costs

over

Delta

Average Fuel Cost per 1000 gallons
$1,409
$2,389

Std Dev
570
319

over

Continental

merger

Average Fuel Cost per 1000 gallons

Std Dev

$2,201

45

$1,595
$2,859

periods

665

$2,733
costs

merger

periods

688
188
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Figure 1: Fuel costs over time
Table 7 shows that for the Delta merger, average disposable income falls
from the period before the merger to the announcement period then rises during the
completion period, but is still lower than the average before the merger. Table 8 shows
that for the United merger, average disposable income is rising from the period before
the merger to the announcement period to the completion period. Disposable income
is rising steadily before the Delta merger, as illustrated by Figure 2. It begins to fall
around the time of the announcement of the merger and continues falling throughout
the announcement period. It starts to increase again right after the merger is completed
and continues rising until the end of the dataset, which includes the announcement and
completion of the United merger. Like fuel costs, the circumstances around disposable
income are considerably different before and after the merger. Again, it is possible that
the relationship observed between disposable income and airfares before the merger
will not continue to hold after as disposable income begins to fall.
Table 7: Disposable Income over Delta merger periods
Before Merger

Announcement Period
After Merger

Average Disposable Income

Std Dev

$35,818

432

$37,780
$36,382

Table 8: Disposable Income over United merger periods
Before Merger

Announcement Period
After Merger

1,527
504

Average Disposable Income

Std Dev

$35,764

69

$34,165
$36,560

1590
352

Figure 2: Disposable income over time
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Table 9 shows that average unemployment is rising from the period before the Delta
merger to the announcement period to the completion period. Table 10 shows that it
is rising from the period before the United merger to the announcement period then
falls during the completion period. Figure 3 illustrates that unemployment rate is rising
from the beginning of the data until the end of 2004, falling until the beginning of
2008, then starts to rise again just before the Delta merger. It remains between 4%
and 6% before the merger. It then rises considerably during the announcement period
of the Delta merger, peaking around 10%. It starts to fall right after the completion of
the merger, and falls until the end of the dataset, including through the announcement
and completion of the United merger. The mergers uncoincidentally occur around
the time of the Great Recession, which significantly impacted unemployment rates.
It is unlikely that the effect that the regression predicts holds after the merger when
the circumstances around unemployment are considerably different. Of the variables
being analyzed, the Great Recession had the largest impact on unemployment. Since
the mergers happen too close the Recession, I do not use unemployment in either
specification of the model I present later.
Table 9: Unemployment over Delta merger periods
Before Merger

Announcement Period
After Merger

Average Unemployment Rate

Std Dev

7.90%

1.85

5.04%
8.50%

0.91

Table 10: Unemployment over United merger periods
Before Merger

Announcement Period
After Merger

0.68

Average Unemployment Rate

Std Dev

9.57%

0.09

5.65%
8.23%

1.58
0.79
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Figure 3: Unemployment over time
IV. Analysis
A. Variables
My analysis focuses on creating a model for fares using data before the
announcement of each of the mergers, using this model to forecast what fares would
have been after the merger had the merger not occurred, and then comparing the actual
price after the merger with this calculated but-for price.
I first limit my dataset to routes where one of the two relevant airlines in each
merger is the largest carrier. This allows me to use the relevant airline’s actual fares
in my analysis, by using the variable for the fare of largest fare carrier. I then limit the
dataset again to routes between one of the relevant airline’s hubs. Tables 12 and 13
list these hub cities. I choose to sample these routes since there are more observations
where one of the relevant airlines is the largest carrier, and since these routes tend to
have more passengers. The public and government should be more interested in the
effects of the merger on these busier routes.
Before running my regression, I adjust some of the variables. Fares and fuel
costs are converted to 2009 dollars using the CPI (I multiply by a ratio of CPI2009/
CPIcurrent year). I calculate quarterly averages for fuel cost and unemployment, which
are given as monthly data. Fuel cost is multiplied by 1000, so the variable represents
the cost in 2009 dollars of 1000 gallons of jet fuel. I calculate the natural logarithm of
distance and multiply fuel cost by distance. I create one, two, three and four quarter lag
variables, averages over the past two quarters, and averages over the past four quarters
for fares, fuel costs, disposable income and unemployment. I create dummy variables
for quarter and city combination. For instance, the dummy variable for the first quarter
equals 1 if and only if the observation is in the first quarter, and 0 otherwise. Similarly,
a dummy variable called “New York-Atlanta” equals 1 if and only if the observation is
a flight between New York and Atlanta in either direction and 0 otherwise.
I use market share as an independent variable to capture trends of changes
in concentration on a route. I attempt to control for these trends in order to separate
changes in market share that happened as a direct result of the merger and changes
in market share that would have occurred even without the merger. In order to do
this, I regress market share of the largest carrier on time for observations before the
announcement of the merger for each of 15 route combinations in the Delta dataset and
each of the 21 route combinations in the United dataset. I choose to regress only over
the period before the announcement rather than completion of the merger since there
may be changes in market share on a given route as a result of the merger even during
the announcement period before the firms actually combine assets. Kim and Singal
(1983) predict that merging firms will begin pricing together during the announcement
period, and market power effects will be observed. The predicted changes in airfares
and response to these changes may change the merging firms’ market shares.
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After regressing market share on time for each route combination, I
forecast market share. I create a new variable that equals actual market share before
the merger and predicted market share after the merger. This is the variable I use to
regress and forecast price. I create route specific lag variables for this market share
variable. For instance, the one quarter lag of market share of an observation will be
the market share on that same route in the previous quarter. Using this in my analysis
allows me to capture the effect of market share on price and control for changes in
concentration that would have occurred even without the merger. Figure 4 shows the
actual and predicted market share for Delta-Northwest and Figure 5 shows the same
for Continental-United. In each figure, the vertical line marks the announcement of
the merger. Differences before the merger are solely attributed to the error term in the
regression. Differences after are attributed to this and also to changes in market share
that were caused by the merger.

Figure 4: Actual and Predicted market share, Delta-Northwest
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Figure 5: Actual and Predicted market share, Continental-United
B. Model
After running several different specifications of regressing fares on different
combinations of controls and running sensitivity analyses, I use the following
specifications of a model to calculate fares:
Specification 1: Fareit = β0 + β1MSlagi,t + β2FuelCostt + β3DispIncomet + β4CinDeti +
β5CinAtl i + β6CinNY i + β7CinMin i + β8CinSL i + β9DetAtl i + β10DetNY i + β11DetMin i
+ β12DetSL i + β13AtlNY i + β14AtlMin i + β15AtlSL i + β16NYMin i + β17NYSL i + β18Q1t
+ β19Q2t + β20Q3t + Ui,t
Specification 2: Fareit = β0 + β1CinDeti + β2CinAtl i + β3CinNY i + β4CinMin i +
β5CinSL i + β6DetAtl i + β7DetNY i + β8DetMin i + β9DetSL i + β10AtlNY i + β11AtlMin i
+ β12AtlSL i + β13NYMin i + β14NYSL i + β15Q1t + β16Q2t + β17Q3t + Ui,t
In the first specification, fare is regressed on market share, fuel cost,
disposable income, a dummy variable for each route combination except one, and
a dummy variable for each quarter except one. Market share is the average market
share over the previous two quarters. This lagged version of market share is used
since firms are likely to use past data on market share when calculating prices.
Furthermore, market share can be an effect of fares in addition to a determinant of
fares. For instance, a firm may gain market share, exercise market power effects and
increase fares. Alternatively, a firm may lower fares and as a result of this decision
gain market share from other firms. Using the lagged variables helps to avoid this
issue of simultaneous causation. Fuel cost is the domestic cost in 2009 dollars of 1000
gallons of jet fuel. Disposable income is per capita national disposable income. The
route dummy variables are equal to one if and only if an observation is between the
two relevant cities. For instance, CinDet = 1 for flights between Cincinnati and Detroit
and 0 otherwise. One route dummy is dropped to avoid multicollinearity. This model
is for analysis of the Delta merger. The United model uses route dummies for the 20
of the 21 different route combinations. Including these dummy variables allows the
model to pick up route specific characteristics of fares, like the effects of distance, the
popularity of a route, and the type of passengers typically served. Similarly, quarter
dummies are equal 1 if and only if the observation occurs in the relevant quarter. For
instance, Q1 = 1 for observations in the first quarter and 0 otherwise. These variables
are included to capture the effects of seasons on fares. Some quarters are more popular
because of holidays and weather patterns.
I regress only during the period before the announcement of the merger.
Therefore, the model should ideally describe how different variables affected fares
prior to the merger. Using these coefficients to forecast fares therefore captures the butfor fares. I predict prices over the announcement period (between announcement and
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completion), the completion period (between completion and the end of the dataset),
and the entire period. Table 11 shows the different time periods used for predicting fares.
Table 11: Time periods
Regression Period

Prediction Period

Before Announcement

Completion Period

Before Announcement

Before Announcement

Announcement Period

Full Period

Table 12: Delta hubs used for sample routes
City

Airport

Detroit,
Michigan

Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Acquired in merger
Airport

Cincinnati,
Ohio

Atlanta,
Georgia

Notes

Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky
International Airport

Hartsfield-Jackson International
Airport

Delta headquarters

Minneapolis,
Minnesota

Minneapolis-Saint Paul International Airport

Salt Lake City,
Utah

Salt Lake City International Airport

Overlapping hub,
former Northwest
headquarters

New York City, LaGuardia Airport, John F. KenNew York
nedy International Airport

Table 13: United hubs used for sample routes
City

Airport

San Francisco,
California

San Francisco International Airport

Washington,
DC

Los Angeles,
California

Washington Dulles International
Airport

Notes

Los Angeles International Airport
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Chicago,
Illinois

O’Hare International Airport

New York City,
New York

Newark Liberty International
Airport

Denver,
Colorado

Denver International Airport

Houston,
Texas

George Bush Intercontinental
Airport

United headquarters

Acquired in merger
Overlapping hub,
largest hub, former
Continental headquarters

C. Predictions
I hypothesize that as market share increases, fares will increase. As market
share increases, a firm may exercise market power effects. Without a merger, there
are no reasons to expect significant efficiency gains from increases in market power.
However, a firm may engage in predatory pricing and lower prices to further increase
its market share. Fuel cost should be positively correlated with fares since an increase
in fuel cost is best captured as a shift inwards of a firm’s supply curve, which results
in a higher equilibrium fare at a lower equilibrium quantity (passengers). Disposable
income should be positively correlated with both fares and passengers. Increases in
income can be illustrated as a shift outwards in demand, which results in a higher
equilibrium price and quantity.
Kim and Singal (1983) predict that only market power effects are observed
during the announcement period, and both market power effects and efficiency gains
are observed during the completion period. This result can be tested by overcharged
for each period.
V. Results
A. Regression Results
Table 14 shows the regression results for specification 1 of the Delta merger.
The coefficient of average market share of the past two quarters is negative but
statistically insignificant. There are a few explanations for why the effect of market
share in previous quarters on current fare is not statistically significant. First, market
share is an imperfect measure since it ignores the number of competitors and their
market shares. A firm with 40% of the market share may face one competitor with
60% of the market share, six competitors with 10% of the market share each, or ten
competitors with 6% of the market share each. The market share variable does not give
enough information on the competitive environment of a given route. Furthermore, the
average market share over the past two periods does not capture any predicted changes
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in market share in the current period that the firm may anticipate. Furthermore, the
model may be picking up on the effect that an increase in price may cause a decrease in
market share. In other words, price is affecting market share rather than market share
affecting price. Even though the model uses a lag of market share, it may still pick up
on this effect since fares today are correlated with past fares.
The coefficient of fuel cost is negative, which is the opposite of what I
predicted. There is no plausible explanation for why an increase in fuel cost would
lower fares, so this must be the result of omitted variable bias or trying to capture
an effect for a variable that does not determine fares. Figure 1 illustrates that before
the merger, fuel cost was increasing at a steady rate. The regression may be using
this variable to capture a decreasing trend in fares over time not related to fuel costs.
The coefficient of disposable income is positive as predicted. The coefficient of
Q1, Q2 and Q2 are all positive, which means that everything else equal, fares are
higher during these quarters and lower during the fourth quarter. The route dummies
capture city specific effects. Figure 6 shows Delta or Northwest’s actual fares and
the fares predicted by this regression. The vertical lines indicate the announcement
and completion of the merger. A comparison of the actual fares with predicted fares
before the announcement of the merger indicates how well the regression output fits
with actual fares. The difference between the actual fare and the predicted fare in
this portion of the graph is attributed solely to the error term in the regression. The
difference between the actual fare and the predicted fare after the announcement of the
merger is attributed to both the error term of the regression and also the effects of the
merger.
Table 14: Delta Regression Results, specification 1
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

P-Value

Fuel cost

-.014

.011

.011

MS last 2 quarters
Disp income last 2 quarters
Q1
Q2
Q3

CinDet
CinAtl

CinNY

CinMin
CinSL

DetAtl

DetNY

-.008
.009

24.366
21.418
12.195
37.251
64.487
42.579
32.061
71.984

-98.701
-70.453

.323
.005

5.983
6.195
6.165

12.070
18.107
13.903
12.061
14.719
11.646

12.191

0.980
.087

0.000
0.001
0.049
.002

0.000
0.002
0.008
0.000
0.000
0.000
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DetMin

68.859

16.428

0.000

AtlNY

-67.806

111.954

0.000

DetSL

-22.284

AtlMin

-87.687

AtlSL

68.594

NYMin

69.897

NYSL

3.620

Constant

-53.689

12.102
11.777

12.574
12.000
11.789

170.961

0.066
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.759
0.754

Table 15 shows results for the second specification of the regression for the
Delta merger. It uses only quarter and route dummies. All quarter dummies are positive
again, meaning that for any route, fares are higher in the first three quarters and lower
in the fourth. The coefficients of the route dummies are not too different than in the
previous specification. Figure 7 plots actual fares with the fares predicted from this
specification of the regression.
Table 15: Delta Regression Results, specification 2
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

P-value

Q2

20.882

6.143

0.001

Q1
Q3

CinDet
CinAtl

CinNY

CinMin
CinSL

DetAtl

DetNY

DetMin
DetSL

AtlNY

AtlMin
AtlSL

NYMin
NYSL
58

23.626
12.131
37.172
69.146
42.392
31.983
71.762

-98.689
-70.543
69.574

-22.574
-67.874
-87.642
68.476
69.824
3.573

5.834
6.143

11.656
11.656
11.626
11.757
11.656
11.656
11.656
11.656
11.778
11.656
11.656
11.656
11.656
11.656

0.000
0.049
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.006
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.056
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.759
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Constant

243.788

9.071

0.000

NYSL

3.620

11.789

0.759

NYMin

69.897

Constant

12.000

-53.689

0.000

170.961

0.754

Table 16 shows results for the first specification of the United regression.
Average market share for a route over the past two quarters is again negative but
not statistically significant. The discussion of this variable from the Delta regression
applies here as well. The coefficient of fuel cost is now positive as predicted, but no
longer statistically significant. The coefficient of disposable income per capita over the
last two quarters is now negative. This is the opposite of what I predicted, and there
is no plausible explanation for this effect. It is likely due to omitted variable bias, or
the regression creating an effect for a variable that does not determine fare and using
the increasing trend in disposable income (see Figure 2) to offset a decreasing trend
in prices. Firms may price according to disposable income in the origin or destination
city, in which case this variable that captures the national average is too imprecise.
Alternatively, firms may not use disposable income to determine price, or perhaps the
lag variable does not best capture the effect of income on price since firms can predict
income in a current quarter and use this prediction rather than past data.
Again, the coefficients of the quarter dummies are all positive, but smaller
than in specification 1 of the Delta regression. Some of the coefficients of the route
dummies are dropped due to either collinearity issues or insufficient data for a
route. Some of the dummy variable coefficients that are calculated are significantly
higher than those in the Delta regressions. For instance, the coefficient of SFNY is
278.509 and the coefficient DCSF is 325.008. Figure 8 plots United or Continental’s
actual fares and the fares predicted from this regression. Again, the region before
the announcement of the merger illustrates the fitness of the regression. Comparing
actual fares with predicted fares in the region after the announcement demonstrates
the effects of the merger.
Table

16:

United

Regression

Results,

specification

Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

P-Value

Fuel cost

0.012

0.012

0.301

MS last 2 quarters
Disp income last 2 qs
Q1
Q2
Q3

DCSF

-.408
-.025

7.662
5.440
8.210

325.008

0.575
0.006
7.884
8.823
8.543

40.722

1

0.479
0.000
0.332
0.538
0.337
0.000
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DCLA

220.412

37.799

0.000

DCDen

162.287

28.745

0.000

DCChi

33.747

SFLA

-14.464

SFChi

125.188

SFDen

76.124

SFNY

278.509

LAChi

57.131

LADen

50.760

ChiDen

41.205

Constant

1023.92

39.723
40.921
38.309
40.020
37.081
37.085
37.338
37.146
197.38

0.396
0.724
0.000
0.058
0.000
0.125
0.175
0.268
0.000

Table 17 shows the results for the second specification of the United
regression. Again, all quarter dummies are positive, and some route dummies have
high coefficients, like DCSF at 282.322. Figure 9 plots United or Continental’s actual
fares with the fares predicted from this specification of the regression.
Table 17: United Regression Results, specification 2
Variable

Coefficient

Standard Error

P-Value

Q2

15.793

9.407

0.094

Q1

10.451

8.605

0.226

Q3

12.168

9.281

0.191

DCLA

183.810

39.940

0.000

DCSF

282.322

DCChi

-7.205

DCDen

123.302

SFLA

-61.436

SFChi

88.581

39.940
39.940
39.940
39.757
39.554

0.000
0.857
0.002
0.123
0.026

SFDen

26.140

39.555

0.509

LAChi

31.358

40.438

0.439

SFNY

247.458

LADen
ChiDen
Constant
60

6.112
-2.080
203.502

40.357

39.602
39.555
30.046

0.000

0.0877
0.958
0.000
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Figure 6: Actual and Predicted fares, Delta merger, specification

Figure 7: Actual and Predicted fares, Delta merger, specification 2

Figure 8: Actual and Predicted fares, United merger, specification 1

Volume 10 | Spring 2015

61

Effect of Airline Mergers on Airfare

Figure 9: Actual and Predicted fares, United merger, specification 2
B. Overcharges
Tables 18 and 19 quantitatively analyze the effects of the merger using a
weighted overcharge. I calculate overcharge as [(Actual Fare – Predicted Fare)/Actual
Fare] for each observation. I also calculate revenue as (Fare x Passengers Per Day).
I then take the sum of revenue for the announcement period, the completion period
and the full period after the merger. I then calculate three different revenue shares
for an observation as revenue of observation/revenue of period, where the period is
the announcement, completion or full period. I then multiply the overcharge of an
observation by each of these three weights. The values in the tables represent the
sums of these weighted overcharges over each respective period. I do this for each
specification of the regression. In other words, under specification 1 of the model,
Delta’s fares are 12.54% lower than what they would have been but-for the merger
during the announcement period, 19.20% higher than what they would have been butfor the merger during the completion period, and 16.41% higher than what they would
have been but-for the merger during the full period. Specification 2 of the model
calculates a lower (more negative) overcharge during the announcement period, a
lower overcharge during the completion period, and a lower overcharge during the
full period than does specification 1. It is interesting to note that overcharges are
negative during the announcement period. This goes against Kim and Singal’s (1983)
prediction that only market power effects are observed during the announcement
period. In fact, prices are lower than what they would have been but-for the merger
during this period, possibly due to efficiency gains from the merger. Overcharges
are positive during the completion period, indicating that there are market power
effects. These market power effects dominate whatever efficiency gains do exist.
Overcharges for the entire period are also positive, indicating that overall, prices were
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higher after the merger than what they would have been had the merger not occurred.
Table 18: Delta Weighted Overcharge
Specification 1

Weighted Overcharge

Specification 2

Weighted Overcharge

Completion

19.20%

Completion

4.32%

Announcement
Full

-12.54%
16.41%

Announcement
Full

-21.10%
2.08%

Table 19 shows the same overcharges for the Continental-United merger.
Under both specifications of the regression, overcharges are negative during the
announcement period, again going against predictions from economic theory. There
seem to be efficiency gains during the announcement period, even though the merging
firms have not yet actually merged. Overcharges during the completion period are
positive under both specifications of the regression. Again, the firm appears to be
exercising market power effects once the merger is completed. Overcharges throughout
the entire period from the announcement of the merger until the end of the dataset are
positive according to both specifications of the regression.
Table 19: United Merger Weighted Overcharge
Specification 1

Weighted Overcharge Specification 2

Weighted Overcharge

Completion

4.30%

5.33%

Announcement -4.89%

Announcement

Full

Full

2.88%

Completion

-3.44%
3.02%

It appears that both mergers raised airfares above what they would have
been had the mergers not occurred. Any efficiency gains resulting from these mergers
are dominated by the large newly merged firms exercising market power effects and
raising airfares.
VI. Conclusion
The first specification of the regression had several coefficients whose signs
did not match predictions and were not plausible. Some of these occurred due to
drastic changes in the variables shortly after the announcement of the merger, some
of these due to the coincidence of the mergers and the Great Recession. Nevertheless,
the regression may retain value due to its ability to accurately track airfares before
the merger. Because of these odd results, I also use the second specification of the
regression stripped down of market share, disposable income and fuel costs. Speciation
2 may have more predictive value than specification 1. It controls for fewer variables,
but these variables were either statistically insignificant or their effect on airfares did
not cohere with economic theory.
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The aviation industry has several unique features that may explain why
certain variables may not affect fares as expected. First, different airlines include
different services with fares while others do not. For instance, some airlines charge
extra to check bags, use in-flight services, or even sit in a window seat or an emergency
exit row. In addition, consumers participate in loyalty programs like miles rewards
that may influence their decision to choose one airline over another. Furthermore,
a significant part of choosing a flight is the convenience of its departure and arrival
times. Consumers are willing to pay more for flights that better fit with their schedules.
The data does not account for this in any way. Additionally, some airlines have better
on-time performance than others, and consumers pay more for an airline’s reliability.
These factors that influence demand and therefore price are not accounted for in the
data.
Nevertheless, despite its flaws, the model shows that both the Delta-Northwest
merger and the United-Continental merger raised airfares above what they would have
been without the merger for the routes that I sampled. While it is difficult to draw
generalizations that apply to the American Airlines-US Airways merger, it appears
that the trend towards consolidation and the creation of behemoth airlines (each of the
three mergers created a new largest airline in the world) may hurt consumers by raising
airfares.
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